目录 / Yodu AI Employees MCP
Yodu AI Employees MCP
Connect your assistant to the AI team doing your company’s work. Yodu exposes workspace-scoped tools to inspect employees and tasks, create and update work, manage memory, and configure supported schedules and settings. Use it to check what needs attention, assign a research task, or inspect an employee’s progress from your MCP client. Begin with get_workspace to confirm the connected workspace. User roles and tool permissions apply. This listing uses Yodu’s OAuth endpoint: https://app.yodu.ai/api/mcp/oauth. API-key clients can use https://app.yodu.ai/api/mcp with a workspace-bound bearer key. Setup: https://docs.yodu.ai/developers/client-setup. Yodu is a hosted commercial service: $499/month includes personal setup and up to five active AI employees, including a Chief of Staff. There is no free trial. Model-provider and third-party tool costs are separate. The MCP connection operates Yodu; employee model access is configured separately.
接入信息
- 传输形态
- http
- 鉴权方式
- 鉴权未知
- 端点
https://yodu--noveum-ai.run.tools
{
"mcpServers": {
"Yodu AI Employees MCP": {
"url": "https://yodu--noveum-ai.run.tools"
}
}
}
能力清单
| 工具 | 说明 |
|---|---|
| get_workspace | Returns the workspace (organization) this connection is bound to. |
| get_workspace_overview | High-level activity for the workspace over the last N days (agents, tasks, needs-attention). |
| get_workspace_settings | Returns safe workspace-level model routing and runtime resource limits. Owner/admin only; no credentials or raw runtime payloads are returned. |
| list_agents | Lists every agent in the workspace (any status) with its runtime id and channel. |
| list_secrets | Lists the workspace's configured secrets by NAME and scope, never their values. Each entry is { scope: 'workspace' | 'agent', agentId?, provider, name, updatedAt, reachesAgentSandbox }. A 'workspace' secret is shared by every agent; an 'agent' secret is private to that agent and overrides the workspace secret of the same name. `reachesAgentSandbox` is the answer to 'can the agents themselves read this?': false means the platform uses it on their behalf but it is absent from their environment, so a script doing `$NAME` will find nothing. Set it with `exposeToAgents` on set_workspace_secret. It reports the CONFIGURED state: sandbox environment is fixed when a container is created, so an agent that is mid-task keeps the old environment until its sandbox is next recreated. Use this to see what is already configured before setting or rotating a secret. Secret VALUES can never be read back through this API. |
| list_role_templates | Lists the role templates a new agent can be created from (id, name, description). |
| list_agent_configs | Lists versioned employee configuration documents, including their Markdown bodies. Restricted to workspace owners and admins because these are privileged operating instructions. |
| list_models | Lists the model references currently runnable in this workspace. Use a returned ref with set_agent_model. Owner/admin only because provider configuration is workspace settings metadata. |
| get_agent_skills | Returns one employee's role-default skills, explicit add/remove override, resolved loadout, assignable catalog, and protected baseline. agentId accepts either the agent id from list_agents or its runtimeAgentId handle (for example program-manager). Owner/admin only. |
| list_connected_tools | Lists safe connected-app metadata plus one employee's current tool-grant rows. agentId accepts either the agent id from list_agents or its runtimeAgentId handle (for example program-manager). Secret values and internal connection config are never returned. Owner/admin only. |
| list_agent_files | Lists metadata for versioned custom employee files under safe skills/** and scripts/** paths. File content is never returned. Owner/admin only. |
| list_memory | Lists workspace memory with optional lifecycle/scope filters. Defaults to shared ACTIVE and DRAFT documents. Employee-local memory must be requested separately with exactly AGENT_LOCAL_MEMORY plus agentId and is owner/admin only. |
| read_memory | Reads one memory document by id. Shared memory is member-readable; set includeAgentLocal only for an employee-local ID (owner/admin only). |
| activate_memory | Activates a sourced non-governed memory draft as live employee context after validating that it has content and provenance. Company OS governed mirrors are read-only and change through proposal review. Owner/admin only; queues runtime application. |
| set_memory_status | Moves a non-governed memory document to DRAFT, SUPERSEDED, or ARCHIVED without deleting it. Company OS governed mirrors are read-only and change through proposal review. Use activate_memory for ACTIVE so provenance validation cannot be bypassed. Owner/admin only. |
| list_tasks | Lists board tasks, optionally filtered by agent, status, priority, label, or search. |
| read_task | Reads one workspace task with its discussion, approval summaries, evidence-file metadata, and activity timeline. Approval decisions and file contents remain outside this tool. |
| get_runtime_health | Latest runtime health snapshot and last successful file-sync time for the workspace. |
| get_runtime_state | Current workspace runtime connection, container, queue, backup, and sync state. Raw commands, errors, endpoints, host paths, worker identities, and credentials are never returned. |
| get_runtime_command_status | Reads the safe status and retry timing for one workspace runtime command. Payloads, results, raw errors, worker identities, host details, and credentials are never returned. |
| list_custom_mcp_servers | Lists the workspace's own custom MCP servers: id, name (the mcporter key), URL, description, configured header NAMES, and the tools last enumerated from each server. Secret header values are never returned. Use the id with remove_custom_mcp_server and the name with set_agent_tool_access. |
| list_scheduled_jobs | Lists one cursor-paginated page of the workspace's scheduled agent jobs with status, cron expression, next/last run, assigned agent, and recent run history. Job prompts are included in the response, so any key with workspace:read can view them. |
| create_memory | Creates a memory document. Shared scopes are member-writable; AGENT_LOCAL_MEMORY requires agentId and an owner/admin role. Body is Markdown. |
| update_memory | Updates a non-governed memory document's title/summary/body by id. Company OS governed mirrors are read-only and change through proposal review. ACTIVE edits must still satisfy provenance/content invariants and are immediately re-applied to the runtime; for reviewed replacements, create a draft and call activate_memory. Set includeAgentLocal only for an employee-local ID (owner/admin only). |
| create_task | Creates a task on the workspace board. |
| update_task | Updates a workspace task's content, priority, due date, link, assignee, or status. Assignment and material changes wake the assigned employee through the existing task workflow. |
| move_task | Moves a task to a board column and optionally positions it between two same-column tasks. A real status transition wakes the assignee; same-column reordering stays silent. |
| comment_task | Adds an authenticated user comment or threaded reply to a workspace task, then wakes its assigned employee (or routes an unassigned task through the existing workflow). |
| create_agent | Creates a safe recruitment draft from a role template. Use the dedicated model, skill, tool-access, and versioned-config tools after creation; raw internal config is intentionally not accepted or returned. Use provision_agent to bring it online. |
| provision_agent | Provisions an agent onto the runtime so it can receive and reply to messages. |
| repair_workspace_runtime | Force-rebuilds this workspace's runtime from Yodu's saved config: a safety backup is taken first, then the container stack is recreated and the full bundle (openclaw.json plus every agent's files) is regenerated from the database. Use when the runtime has drifted or broken, or to roll out config changes to every agent at once. Disruptive: in-flight agent turns are interrupted while the stack restarts. |
| set_workspace_model_routing | Sets the workspace primary model and ordered cross-provider fallbacks, then queues runtime application. Every configured provider must appear exactly once in a custom route; null primary with no fallbacks restores automatic routing. |
| set_workspace_runtime_resources | Sets workspace gateway memory/CPU limits and queues runtime application. Empty/null restores platform defaults. Owner/admin only. |
| set_workspace_cost_guardrail | Sets the work-admission cost ceiling in USD for the rolling 3-HOUR admission window; agents stop creating NEW tasks once consumption in that window crosses it (work already in flight and its review are never suppressed). Measures list-price consumption INCLUDING flat-subscription usage, because a subscription-only workspace has no invoice to guard — so set it against 3 hours of list-price burn, which on Opus-class models routinely runs to three figures, not against a monthly invoice. Pass null to remove the ceiling. Owner/admin only. |
| set_agent_autonomy | Sets an agent's autonomy mode (DRAFT_ONLY, APPROVAL_REQUIRED, AUTONOMOUS). AUTONOMOUS_UNSAFE (skips ALL human approval gates) is intentionally not settable via API. Use the app UI. |
| write_agent_config | Writes one of the seven versioned employee configuration documents: SOUL, SYSTEM_PROMPT, MEMORY_POLICY, TOOL_POLICY, RUNTIME_FILES, SCHEDULE, or MODEL_POLICY. `body` is Markdown. Set status ACTIVE to apply it to the running employee; DRAFT to stage it. |
| set_agent_model | Sets the model an agent runs on (e.g. claude-max/claude-opus-4-8, openai/gpt-5.5). Must be a model configured for this workspace. Pass null/empty to clear the override and use the workspace default. |
| set_agent_role | Reassigns an agent to a different role. Pass the target role's roleId (e.g. "customer-support", from list_role_templates); the role must already exist in this workspace. The stored role is normalized to that roleId, so this also fixes an agent whose role was set to a raw template id. Identity handles (channelSlug, runtimeAgentId) are not changed. |
| set_agent_skills | Adjusts an agent's skill loadout: `add` and/or `remove` skill slugs relative to its role's baseline. |
| set_agent_cloud_coding | Enables or disables Claude Code or Codex for one employee. Disabling uses the normal cancellation-safe workflow and stops that employee's live sessions for the provider. |
| set_agent_tool_access | Enables or disables ONE tool integration for ONE agent. Tool access is a per-agent boolean: enabled (the default when no grant exists) means the agent sees and can use the tool; disabled hides it from that agent entirely. For a connected app pass connectionId plus category = the provider and integrationKey = composio:<provider>; toolName defaults to the connection's display name. For a workspace custom MCP server pass category = custom-mcp, integrationKey = custom-mcp:<serverId>, toolName = the server name from list_custom_mcp_servers (required: the runtime hides MCP servers by name; the id is also accepted); never pass connectionId with custom-mcp. Risky actions on enabled tools still go through the approval gate, which is controlled per agent by set_agent_autonomy, not here. |
| create_scheduled_job | Creates a recurring job: at each cron tick the prompt is delivered to the assigned agent's channel as a message to act on. cronExpression is standard 5-field cron evaluated in the job's timezone (an IANA name such as America/New_York; missing or invalid values fall back to UTC), so 0 15 * * 1-5 with timezone America/New_York fires at 15:00 New York time on weekdays. Pass agentId to assign the job; an unassigned job is skipped at run time. |
| update_scheduled_job | Updates a scheduled job. Pass the job's `id`, the value returned by create_scheduled_job or list_scheduled_jobs (`jobId` is accepted as an alias). Updates name, description, cronExpression, timezone, prompt, agentId, or status (PAUSED, ARCHIVED). Activation is deliberately separate and parity-gated. A new cronExpression or timezone recomputes timing in the job's effective timezone (an IANA name such as America/New_York; missing or invalid values fall back to UTC). |
| delete_scheduled_job | Deletes a scheduled job by id (from list_scheduled_jobs). Returns deleted: false when no such job exists in this workspace. |
| run_scheduled_job | Runs one scheduled job immediately for end-to-end testing without changing its cron cadence. This is model-initiated work, so the global autonomous-execution gate and the employee's normal approval policy both apply. |
| activate_scheduled_job | Activates a PAUSED or draft scheduled job so its cron fires again. Refused when the assigned employee is absent from the latest runtime parity check, because a schedule pointing at an agent the runtime does not have would fire into nothing. Pair with update_scheduled_job, which can pause but deliberately cannot activate. |
| add_custom_mcp_server | Registers a workspace-owned custom MCP server (name + https URL + optional request headers) that every agent can reach via mcporter. Header values are stored encrypted and never returned. |
| remove_custom_mcp_server | Removes a workspace-owned custom MCP server. Pass the server's `id` from list_custom_mcp_servers (`serverId` is accepted as an alias). Queues a runtime provision so it disappears from every agent's mcporter registry. The stored list, minus that server and its encrypted request headers, is saved as a new secret version. Removing an unknown id is a no-op. |
| set_model_provider_key | Stores a model provider API key (OpenAI/Anthropic/OpenRouter/Claude subscription). Write-only: it can never be read back through MCP. |
| connect_cloud_agent | Connects a Claude Code routine (created at claude.ai/code/routines) so AI employees can delegate coding tasks to cloud sessions on the customer's Claude subscription. Write-only: the trigger token can never be read back. |
| list_connected_github_for_coding | Lists workspace-scoped GitHub integrations and client-safe repository metadata for cloud coding. Connected-account identifiers, credentials, and tokens are never returned. Owner/admin only. |
| connect_cloud_coding_repo | Connects a GitHub repo for INTERACTIVE cloud coding (the primary tier): a real Claude Code session runs in a per-workspace container, clones the repo, works on a branch, and opens a PR. Unlike connect_cloud_agent (routines), this needs NO routine id and NO token. For a private repo, first call list_connected_github_for_coding and pass its workspace-scoped integration connection id; the Yodu GitHub App must already have an active owner-verified binding to this workspace. |
| list_cloud_agent_connections | Lists connected cloud coding agents — both routines and interactive sidecar repos. Tokens are never included. |
| update_cloud_agent_connection | Revokes one cloud-agent or cloud-coding connection in this workspace while preserving its audit history. The organization fence is part of the update, and no secret or credential is returned. Owner/admin only. |
| get_cloud_agent_setup_guide | Returns Yodu's canonical Claude Code routine prompt template and the numbered claude.ai steps to set up a cloud coding agent (plan requirements, GitHub access, routine creation, Environment and network configuration, and the API trigger). Read-only: use connect_cloud_agent once you have the routine's trig_ id and trigger token. There is no routine-creation API, so a human must perform the claude.ai steps; this tool only returns the instructions. |
| set_workspace_secret | Stores an arbitrary tool secret (e.g. APOLLO_API_KEY, a Stripe restricted key). Write-only: it can never be read back through MCP. By DEFAULT a secret is consumed by the platform on the agent's behalf (model providers, web search, MCP auth) and is NOT visible to the agent itself. Pass `exposeToAgents: true` to also project the value into every agent's sandbox environment, so their own scripts and shell commands can read it as `$NAME` (the database URLs the `db-readonly-lookups` skill reads, YODU_AGENT_DB_URL_RO / YODU_AGENT_DB_URL / API_MARKET_DB_URL, are projected without the flag). The agent runtime DELETES sandbox variables whose names look like a provider credential, so `exposeToAgents` is refused for a name ending in API_KEY, TOKEN, PASSWORD, PRIVATE_KEY or SECRET: put such a credential in a single connection URL instead (ES_URL rather than ES_HOST + ES_PASSWORD). Call `list_secrets` afterwards to confirm `reachesAgentSandbox`. A newly exposed value reaches an agent when its sandbox container is next created, not inside a turn that is already running. Pass `agentId` to scope the secret to ONE agent (it overrides the workspace secret of the same name for that agent); omit it for a workspace-wide secret shared by every agent. Use an env-style NAME (e.g. TWITTER_API_KEY) so it becomes a valid environment variable. |
| write_agent_file | Provisions a custom file into ONE agent's runtime workspace: a helper script the agent runs (e.g. scripts/x_post.py) or a custom skill (skills/<name>/SKILL.md). `path` is relative and MUST start with `skills/` or `scripts/`; no root-level file is writable (`.env`, SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, TOOLS.md, IDENTITY.md, USER.md, HEARTBEAT.md, AGENTS.md are owned by the runtime/config docs) and the path can never escape the workspace. The baseline skill directories (skills/mcporter/, skills/human-writing/, skills/db-readonly-lookups/) are platform-managed and not writable either. The file is written on the next provision. Returns metadata only. |
| list_management_grants | Lists who currently holds which Company OS management authority (WORK_TRANSITION, WORK_ASSIGN, REVIEW_DECIDE, ...) in this workspace, with the agent or member each grant belongs to. Revoked and expired grants are omitted. Read this before granting: an authority somebody already holds does not need a second grant. |
| update_management_grant | Issues or withdraws one Company OS management authority, mirroring the workspace UI. operation="GRANT" needs principalId + action; operation="REVOKE" needs grantId + reason. Grant WORK_TRANSITION to let a teammate accept a peer's submitted work, which is what drains a REVIEW queue that has paused task creation workspace-wide. `principalId` accepts an agent id or its runtimeAgentId handle. Scope defaults to the whole workspace; only AGENT scope takes a boundary, and it requires boundaryAgentId. A withdrawn grant is not resurrected by the role reconcile; issue a new one to restore the authority. Revoking WORK_CREATE or WORK_ASSIGN does not stop an agent handing work to a hired teammate, which every agent may do, or handing over a task it owns. Owner/admin only. |
| list_workspaces | Lists the workspaces this connection is authorized to reach and marks which one is the active workspace. Every other tool acts on the active workspace only. Call set_active_workspace to move to a different one. |
| set_active_workspace | Switches the active workspace for this connection, by workspaceId or slug (both come from list_workspaces). Takes effect immediately and persists, so every other tool acts on the newly selected workspace from the next call onward. Only workspaces authorized at connection time can be selected. |
提交举报 / 纠错
侵权举报经核验成立后,我们会即时下线该条目并删除已存的内容副本。